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BAKKE BELOW: A CONSTITUTIONAL FALLACY
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.* and Henry Hewitt**
INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the California Supreme Court's reasoning
in Bakke v. Regents of the University of California' is a funda-
mental misapplication of constitutional law. The court's use of
the strict scrutiny equal protection test in evaluating the uni-
versity's special admissions program for minority medical stu-
dents was an erroneous application of that test as it has been
historically developed by the United States Supreme Court.
When the Bakke court's misuse of strict scrutiny is corrected,
the special minority admissions program of the medical school
is in accord with the United States Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.'
This article examines the Bakke decision by comparing
the historical and present use of the strict scrutiny test by the
United States Supreme Court with the California Supreme
Court's use of the same test. Before examining the origin of
strict scrutiny, it is important to note the reasoning used by the
California court in deciding to apply the wrong constitutional
test.
The California Supreme Court saw in the Bakke facts the
narrow issue whether racial classification of medical school
applicants intended to assist minorities, but having the effect
of denying some members of the white majority admission to
medical school, violates the constitutional rights of white ap-
plicants.' In deciding the issue, the court posed two subsidiary
* Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, Compliance Unit; J.D.,
1965, Columbia University; Ph.D., 1970, Graduate Theological Union; member of the
California bar.
** Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, Compliance Unit; J.D.,
1967, University of Chicago; member of the California bar.
1. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-811).
2. No claim is made that this contention is novel or original. The same point has
been explicitly formulated by the United States Supreme Court on numerous occasions
(see text accompanying notes 31-41, infra) and is set forth cogently by Justice Tobri-
ner in his dissent in Bakke (3 Cal. 3d at 79-80, 553 P.2d at 1183, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 711).
For a general discussion of so called reverse discrimination against whites, see Ely,
The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974).
3. The court stated, "The issue to be determined thus narrows to whether a racial
classification which is intended to assist minorities, but which also has the effect of
385
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questions: (1) what equal protection test should be applied and
(2) did the medical school minority admissions program meet
the applicable test?4
In most cases of government classification, the Bakke
court acknowledged, the proper equal protection test is the
rational basis test: governmental classifications are "valid 'if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived' in their justifi-
cation."' The court then noted however, that a second test,
which requires that courts exercise strict scrutiny, applies in
some circumstances.' After asserting that the strict scrutiny
test must be applied in cases involving classifications which
impose a detriment on the basis of race, the court stated that
the strict scrutiny test can be met only if the classification
meets a compelling state interest and if no less onerous alterna-
tives exist.7
The court considered and rejected the university's argu-
ment that the rational basis test should apply in Bakke since
the racial classification did not discriminate against minori-
ties. The court explicitly repudiated the contention that differ-
ent equal protection tests apply depending upon whether the
classification burdens the white majority or a minority group.'
depriving those who are not so classified of benefits they would enjoy but for their race,
violates the constitutional rights of the majority." 18 Cal. 3d at 48, 553 P.2d at 1162,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
4. Specifically, the court noted that "[tiwo distinct inquiries emerge at this
point; first, what test is to be used in determining whether the program violates the
equal protection clause; and second, does the program meet the requirements of the
applicable test." Id. at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
5. Id.
6. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976), decided after Bakke was announced,
indicates that an intermediate "important interest/substantial relation" test has now
emerged. For the implications of this development see text accompanying notes 54-56
infra. Although Justice Tobriner, in dissent, discussed the possibility of using an
intermediate test, the majority applied the traditional "two-tier" equal protection
analysis.
7. The court stated:
Classification by race is subject to strict scrutiny, at least where the
classification results in detriment to a person because of his race. In the
case of such a racial classification, not only must the purpose of the
classification serve a "compelling state interest," but it must be demon-
strated by rigid scrutiny that there are no reasonable ways to achieve the
state's goals by means which impose a lesser limitation on the rights of
the group disadvantaged by the classification. The burden in both re-
spects is upon the government.
18 Cal. 3d at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
8. The court stated: "We cannot agree with the proposition that deprivation
based upon race is subject to a less demanding standard of review under the Four-
teenth Amendment if the race discriminated against is the majority rather than a
minority." Id. at 50, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
[Vol. 17
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After giving several reasons for its conclusion,9 the court ended
its discussion of what test should be applied by briefly noting
that there had been cases not directly on point which indicated
judicial reluctance to apply different standards to rights of
ethnic minorities and the white majority.'0
The remaining sections of the California Supreme Court's
Bakke opinion contained no further analysis of the critical de-
cision to apply the strict scrutiny test. Rather, the Court went
on to discuss whether the strict scrutiny test had been met by
the university and other subordinate questions, such as proce-
dures to be used on remand. Ultimately, the court concluded
that the university did not satisfy the strict scrutiny test and
that the special admissions program was therefore unconsti-
tutional.
BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST
The strict scrutiny test, as conceived and developed by the
United States Supreme Court, is not applicable in Bakke, since
the racial classification used by the University of California in
its special minority admissions program is not the kind of
"suspect classification" which is subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny. Examination of the history of the strict scrutiny test
provides a basis for understanding the misapplication of the
test in Bakke.
Carolene Products: The Locus Classicus of the Strict Scrutiny
Test
The first explicit formulation of the strict scrutiny test by
the United States Supreme Court occurred in the celebrated
footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co." Au-
thored by Justice Harlan F. Stone, footnote four introduced
the concept that there are three specific situations when the
judicial branch should give more exacting review to legisla-
9. The following reasons are mentioned. First, there are no cases so holding.
Second, racial discrimination is equally unjustified regardless of the race against which
it is directed. Third, since the racial classification imposes a disadvantage upon whites,
it should be considered suspect even though it does not impose an invidious stigma.
Fourth, since the equal protection clause by its terms applies neutrally to any
"person," it must be applied uniformly to all racial and ethnic groups. In a footnote,
the court proposed a fifth reason: the white majority itself is a pluralistic group of
minorities. Id. at 50-51 n.16, 553 P.2d at 1163-64 n.16, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92 n.16.
10. Id. at 51, 553 P.2d at 1164, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
11. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
1977]
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tion: first, when the legislation contravenes specific prohibi-
tions set forth in the United States Constitution; second,
when it tends to undermine the open functioning of the demo-
cratic process; third, when it imposes burdens upon discrete
and insular religious, national or racial minorities."
The general topic of footnote four is the so called
"presumption of constitutionality." This presumption, which
applies in most cases where legislation is challenged, requires
the courts to uphold the legislation in question unless it is
clearly unconstitutional. In terms of the equal protection
clause, this translates roughly into the familiar "rational basis"
12. Footnote four reads:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a spe-
cific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amend-
ments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-
370; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judi-
cial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the
right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73; on restraints upon the dissemination of information, see Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-714, 718-720, 722; Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on interfer-
ences with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California, supra,
369; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373-378; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; and see Holmes, J., in Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly,
see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390;
Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 484, or
racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon, supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra:
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a spe-
cial condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; South Carolina v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184, n.2, and cases cited.
Id. (emphasis added).
Since the special admissions program involved in the Bakke case does not contra-
vene any specific constitutional prohibition but instead is challenged only under the
"general prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment," the first component of the strict
scrutiny test is not discussed in detail in this article. The focus is on the political
rationale underlying the second and third components. Primary emphasis will be on
the third ("suspect classification") component, which was relied upon by the court in
Bakke.
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test-courts must uphold the use of legislative classifications
if the legislature could rationally conclude that the classifica-
tion serves a valid governmental interest. 3
The seminal idea expressed by the Supreme Court in foot-
note four is that there may be a narrow class of cases in which
legislative judgments will be subject to more exacting or more
searching judicial scrutiny. Since the formulation in Carolene
Products has been widely recognized as the locus classicus of
the strict scrutiny test,'4 it merits careful study in order to
determine the precise purpose and scope of the exceptions to
the general presumption of constitutionality.
A fundamental premise of the footnote is that the normal
method of altering unsound governmental conduct is the legis-
lative process. In a democratic society, if the majority of the
people are opposed to governmental conduct, they can nor-
mally alter that conduct by enacting statutes which embody
their wishes. What the Court recognized in Carolene Products
was that, in a narrowly limited number of situations, this logic
does not apply. There are a few situations in which the majori-
tarian political process cannot be relied upon to correct legisla-
tive abuses.'5 The Court referred to two such situations. If the
legislation itself undercuts the very political process which
would normally be used to repeal undesirable legislation, then
it is obviously unwise to presume that it can be corrected
through further legislation." Similarly, if the legislation im-
poses burdens on discrete, insular minority groups, it cannot
safely be presumed that the political process can be trusted to
correct any injustices involved, since-in contrast to the politi-
13. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
14. See, e.g., In re Griffliths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
15. Although the footnote speaks only of legislation, its rationale is equally ap-
plicable to conduct by the executive branches of federal and state governments.
16. An example would be a statute which prohibits free speech. Since such a
statute would close down the open marketplace of political ideas which is the founda-
tion of the democratic process, it would be unwise for courts to assume that the self-
corrective mechanisms of the democratic process could be relied upon to repeal the
legislation. The same would be true for legislation prohibiting free press, public assem-
blies or the right to vote. Cf. Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964), where the Court entered the previously forbidden thicket of elec-
toral districting because the legislative process could no longer be relied upon to correct
the serious problem of unequal voter representation.
19771
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cal majority-such minorities do not have the votes and politi-
cal power needed to obtain passage of remedial legislation.
In short, the fundamental concept underlying the second
and third prongs of the strict scrutiny test-as formulated in
the Carolene Products case-is a political one. In those narrow
cases where the majoritarian political process cannot be relied
upon to correct the evils of governmental conduct, the courts
should insist on a clear and convincing showing of justification
for the governmental action. In other cases, however, where
there is no attack either upon the fundamental constitutional
underpinnings of the democratic process itself or upon politi-
cally powerless minorities, the court should exercise restraint
and uphold the governmental conduct as long as it has some
arguably rational basis.
For purposes of the Bakke case, only the third ("suspect
classification") component of the Carolene Products analysis is
directly relevant." It should be noted that, in discussing the
third component, the Court explicitly limited the requirement
of "more exacting scrutiny" to governmental conduct imposing
a detriment or burden on minority groups. In fact, the reference
to minorities was made twice. Moreover, the Court indicated
that the reason for using strict scrutiny where legislation bur-
dens minority groups is that the majoritarian political process
cannot be relied upon to protect the interests of those groups. 9
Thus, with regard to racial classifications, the Carolene
Products opinion, by its own terms, limited the application of
the strict scrutiny test to situations in which the racial classifi-
cation places a burden on racial minorities. In other words, the
strict scrutiny test, in its inception, did not apply to racial
classifications which impose burdens upon the racial majority,
since the majority controls the political process and can thus
17. The first and second components are not on point since the Supreme Court
has explicitly held that the right to education is not a fundamental constitutional right
which triggers the strict scrutiny test. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-
quez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
18. Footnote four states in relevant part: "Nor need we enquire whether similar
considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, . . . or
national, . . . or racial minorities, . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, . . . which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (emphasis added).
19. The Court stated: "Nor need we enquire . . . whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities .... " Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 17
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rely upon normal political procedures for relief from any unjust
burdens. 0
Background of Carolene Products. The original rationale
for the strict scrutiny test, as delineated in the language of
footnote four in Carolene Products, was essentially political.
Except in cases involving specific constitutional prohibitions,
courts should apply strict scrutiny in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of governmental conduct only in those cases where the
normal political process cannot be relied upon to provide
needed corrective action. The fact that political theory lay at
the core of the Court's thinking in Carolene Products may be
further demonstrated through analysis of the historical back-
ground of the case.
From the appointment of Roger B. Taney in 1837 to
roughly 1895, the normal practice of the United States Su-
preme Court was to defer to the judgment of the other branches
of government on legislative and executive matters. Only rarely
did the Court of the mid-1800's declare governmental conduct
to be unconstitutional. Perhaps the classic case illustrating this
practice was Munn v. Illinois," the leading post-Civil War case
acknowledging the authority of state legislatures to regulate
20. Although it is generally agreed that footnote four of Carotene Products is the
"classic" formulation of the notion that racial classifications are subject to strict scru-
tiny, a critical reader might raise an objection to the contention that footnote four is
the origin of that test. It is true that, during the period from the passage of the
fourteenth amendment to the issuance of the Carotene Products opinion, a number of
cases came before the Supreme Court which involved fourteenth amendment chal-
lenges to the use of racial classifications. It is also true that the Supreme Court, as a
general rule, struck down such classifications. From this perspective, it can be said
that the Supreme Court was applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications before
Carotene Products.
The pre-Carotene cases, however, do not provide guidelines for considering the
constitutionality of racial classifications imposing burdens on the white majority, since
all of those cases involved the imposition of burdens on minority groups. Moreover,
the judicial activism of the pre-Carolene Court was based on principles concerning the
general role of the judiciary which have subsequently been rejected and which no
longer provide accurate guidance as to situations in which strict scrutiny is appropri-
ate. To put the point another way, the undisciplined use of strict, if not hostile scrutiny
of governmental conduct by the pre-Carotene Supreme Court does not provide rational
guidelines for the exercise of strict scrutiny in the post-Roosevelt era of judicial re-
straint.
There appears to be little doubt that Carotene Products is the birthplace of the
concept of strict scrutiny in its modern, principled sense. The term "strict scrutiny"
is a direct paraphrase of the terms "more exacting judicial scrutiny" and "more search-
ing judicial scrutiny" used in footnote four. More importantly, however, Carotene
Products marks the first attempt by the Supreme Court to formulate a principled basis
for the application of strict scrutiny against the background of the philosophy of
judicial restraint which emerged in the late 1930's.
21. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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the business practices of corporations. The prevailing doctrine
during this period was that legislatures have general authority
to enact statutes protecting the health, safety and welfare of
the people and that the judicial branch should defer to the
judgment of the legislature in such matters.
The year 1895 marked the beginning of an era in which the
Supreme Court, with increasing frequency, overthrew the deci-
sions of the legislative and executive branches and substituted
its own judgment as to what constituted proper governmental
conduct."2 During this period, the presumption of constitution-
ality was anemic, if not nonexistent. The pattern of judicial
supremacy, which began with the overthrow of the federal in-
come tax in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,23 and the
nullification of the Sherman Act in United States v. E. C.
Knight Co.,24 continued until the late 1930's. Moreover, with
minor exceptions, the Court's willingness to substitute its own
judgment for that of the legislature increased in intensity
throughout this period until it reached the status of a govern-
mental crisis in the 1930's. From 1895 through 1936, numerous
congressional programs were declared unconstitutional. 5 By
the mid-1930's, the conflict between the judicial and legislative
branches had resulted in a full-scale attempt by the federal
courts to declare the New Deal unconstitutional.26
During the late 1930's, a constitutional revolution oc-
curred. The Court, with new personnel appointed by President
Roosevelt, rejected the notion that it should sit as the ultimate
censor of legislation. The presumption of constitutionality was
reinstated in the strongest terms, and a philosophy of judicial
restraint Was adopted. The doctrine enunciated by the Roosev-
elt Court and subsequently restated in numerous cases is that
legislation should be upheld, as a general rule, as long as the
Court can conceive of any rational basis to support it.27
An important question that gradually emerged in the
22. E. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION (1928); R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941).
23. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
24. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
25. The most frequent basis for overturning legislation was the concept of sub-
stantive due process. Other grounds included the commerce clause, unlawful delega-
tion of executive power, and unlawful encroachment on states' rights.
26. During the 1935-36 period, "Sixteen hundred injunctions restraining officers
of the Federal Government from carrying out acts of Congress were granted by federal
judges." R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 115 (1941).
27. See cases cited note 13 supra.
[Vol. 17
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aftermath of the constitutional revolution of the 1930's was
whether the presumption of constitutionality and its corollary,
the doctrine of judicial restraint, should apply in all cases or
whether there should be areas in which governmental conduct
should be subject to closer judicial scrutiny. Justice Frank-
furter was the leader of a group of justices who felt that the
doctrine of judicial restraint should apply in all cases." Other
justices, including Justices Black and Douglas, asserted that
exceptional circumstances did exist in which the presumption
of constitutionality should be set aside."9 The clash between
those two viewpoints developed into a major constitutional
debate focusing explicitly on the degree of control that the
Court should exercise over the legislative and executive
branches.
Carolene Products was the first attempt by the Roosevelt
Court to formulate a principled exception to the emerging doc-
trine of judicial restraint. The case itself involved an applica-
tion of the new general rule requiring the Court to uphold the
constitutionality of legislation "unless in the light of the facts
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as
to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators."30
Thus, the revitalized concept of judicial deference to the major-
itarian political process provided both the general and the
immediate framework in which the Court speculated, by way
of footnote four, regarding possible situations in which "more
exacting scrutiny" or "more searching judicial scrutiny" may
be appropriate.
28. "Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the
situation before us [freedom of speech and national security] of necessity belongs to
the Congress .... We are to set aside the judgment of those whose duty it is to legislate
only if there is no reasonable basis for it." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the
Process of Judicial Review, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 295, 300-03 (1954).
29. "So long as this Court exercises the power of judicial review of legislation, I
cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to sustain a law suppressing free-
dom of speech and press on the basis of Congress' or our own notions of
,reasonableness."' Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissent-
ing). See Decker, Justice Hugo L. Black: The Balancer of Absolutes, 59 CALIF. L. REV.
1335, 1348-53 (1971).
Justice Douglas felt that the legislative judgment on economic and business mat-
ters was "well-nigh conclusive," (Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)), but that
when legislation invaded freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights the Court must
take an active reviewing role. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509-22 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of
the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 716, 717-18 (1969).
30. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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In summary, an examination of the historical context in
which Carotene Products arose confirms the fact that political
theory concerning the workings of majoritarian democracy lay
at the very heart of the Court's thinking in formulating foot-
note four. The background of Carolene was a major constitu-
tional revolution based upon the central concept that, in a
democracy, the Court should not exercise veto power over the
majoritarian legislative process. The Carolene Court suggested
that there might be exceptions in which the doctrine of judicial
restraint should not apply, namely, situations where a specific
constitutional prohibition is involved or where the majoritarian
political process cannot be relied upon to correct governmental
abuse.
The critical point for the Bakke decision is that, from the
Carolene perspective, racial classifications which burden the
majority are not subject to "more exacting scrutiny," since the
political process can be used by the majority to change the
governmental program using the racial classification.
Progeny of Carolene Products. The Carolene Products no-
tion 3' that the strict scrutiny test applies when governmental
classifications impose a burden on minority groups has been
reaffirmed in a number of subsequent United States Supreme
Court cases, including at least five cases decided since 1970.
In Graham v. Richardson, which held that alienage is a
suspect classification, the Court stated:
Under traditional equal protection principles, a State re-
tains broad discretion to classify as long as its classifica-
tion has a reasonable basis.... But the Court's decisions
have established that classifications based on alienage,
like those based on nationality or race, are inherently sus-
pect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a "discrete and insular" minority
(see United States v. Carotene Products Co.) for whom
such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.2
31. By this and subsequent references to the "Carolene Products notion" or
the "Carotene Products principle," we do not mean to suggest that footnote four is
binding authority. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (Justice Frankfurter's comments concerning the inappropriateness of an-
nouncing new constitutional doctrine by way of dicta in a footnote). The point remains,
however, that Carolene Products is acknowledged as the source of the concepts in
question.
32. 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (emphasis added). The quoted language mentions
the concept that strict scrutiny is to be given to suspect classifications. The term1suspect classification" is nothing more than a shorthand term developed by the Court
to refer to the kinds of classification specified in the third component of the Carolene
[Vol. 17
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Although the Graham opinion contains a general statement
that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, the
statement is qualified by the immediately ensuing sentence
which reiterates the Carolene Products suggestion that height-
ened judicial solicitude is appropriate because the classifica-
tion burdens a discrete and insular minority."
One of the most explicit statements demonstrating that
the strict scrutiny test, as developed by the United States Su-
preme Court, applies to racial classifications only when they
burden minority groups is the following statement in Justice
Powell's majority opinion in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriquez:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it de-
fines have none of the traditional indices of suspectness:
the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or rele-
gated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process."
This language contains a very specific restatement of the fun-
damental notion that the strict scrutiny test is concerned with
situations where the classification burdens a politically power-
Products footnote as deserving strict scrutiny.
33. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (overturning a city charter provi-
sion requiring a referendum on all ordinances designed to prevent racial discrimina-
tion). In its opinion (per Justice White), the Court stated,
Moreover, although the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and
gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls
on the minority. The majority needs no protection against discrimination
and if it did, a referendum might be bothersome, but no more than that.
Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), Justices Stewart, Burger and Black-
mun, dissenting in part from a decision overturning a voting age statute, twice asserted
that the challenged state action was not subject to strict scrutiny because it did not
burden a political minority: "The establishment of an age qualification is not state
action aimed at any discrete and insular minority." Id. at 295 n.14 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting, in part). "The state laws that it [§§ 302 of the 1970 Amendments to the
Voting Rights Act] invalidates do not invidiously discriminate against any discrete
and insular minority." Id. at 296.
34. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (emphasis added). The Rodriquez case involved a chal-
lenge to Texas' method of financing public schools through local property taxes. The
system was attacked under the fourteenth amendment on the ground that it arbitrarily
discriminated against students in school districts having low tax bases. The Court held
that the right to education is not a fundamental constitutional right for purposes of
triggering the strict scrutiny test and that an economic classification such as that
involved in the Texas school finance system is not the type of suspect classification
which requires strict scrutiny.
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less minority group which cannot obtain redress through the
majoritarian political process. Obviously, the reasoning does
not apply to the white majority, which is not politically power-
less and therefore can be expected to protect itself through the
normal political process. 5
Two 1973 cases involving the issue of discrimination
against resident aliens used language clearly implying that leg-
islative classifications are suspect and thus subject to strict
scrutiny only if they burden minority groups. In re Griffiths, 31
which involved the exclusion of aliens from the Connecticut
bar, repeated in full the statement in Graham v. Richardson
concerning discrete and insular minorities. In Sugarman v.
Dougall, the following paraphrase was used:
In Graham v. Richardson, . . . we observed that aliens as
a class "are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
minority (see United States v. Carolene Products Co.),"
and that classifications based on alienage are "subject to
close judicial scrutiny.""
Even Justice Rehnquist, arguing in his Sugarman dissent that
the only suspect classifications under the fourteenth amend-
ment are racial classifications, seems to acknowledge that ra-
cial classifications are only suspect when they burden racial
minorities. "But there is no language used in the Amendment,
or any historical evidence as to the intent of the framers, which
would suggest to the slightest degree that it was ... designed
in any way to protect 'discrete and insular minorities' other
than racial minorities.""
35. The first two "indices of suspectness" set forth in the Rodriquez case also
recognized the difference between classifications which burden discrete minority
groups which have been victimized by discrimination and those which burden the
favored white majority. Thus, use of the strict scrutiny test is not indicated unless the
class burdened by the classification is saddled with disabilities which "command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process" or has been sub-
jected to a history of purposeful unequal. treatment. Clearly the white majority meets
neither of these conditions.
36. 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973).
37. 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 649-50. A similar point of view has been expressed by Justice Rehnquist
in his dissent in Craig v. Boren:
Most obviously unavailable to support any kind of special scrutiny
in this case, is a history or pattern of past discrimination, such as was
relied on by the plurality in Frontiero to support its invocation of strict
scrutiny. There is no suggestion in the Court's opinion that males in this
age group are in any way peculiarly disadvantaged, subject to systematic
discriminatory treatment, or otherwise in need of special solicitude from
the courts.
[Vol. 17
BAKKE BELOW
Finally, in Johnson v. Robison, which rejected the conten-
tion that legislation denying veterans benefits to conscientious
objectors should be subject to strict scrutiny, the Court quoted
with approval the following district court statement to the ef-
fect that the underlying rationale of the strict scrutiny test
applies only to minority groups:
[I]t would seem presumptuous of a court to subject the
educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the
basis of the 'suspect classification' theory, whose underly-
ing rationale is that, where legislation affects discrete and
insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality
fades because traditional political processes may have bro-
ken down. 9
Moreover, the Johnson Court again recited the language of the
Rodriquez opinion which indicates that the strict scrutiny test
applies only to minority groups characterized by "such a posi-
tion of political powerlessness as to demand extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process.""
The underlying political rationale of the strict scrutiny test
as first enunciated in Carolene Products is alive and well in the
United States Supreme Court. The fundamental concept is
that classifications are suspect, and thus subject to strict scru-
tiny, when they impose burdens on classes which demand ex-
traordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
Classifications burdening racial minorities fit this description
since such minorities are "politically powerless" and thus can-
not protect themselves through the normal political process.
Moreover, such minorities have been saddled with disabilities
and subjected to a history of deliberately unequal treatment.
These indices are not present, however, in situations where the
racial classification burdens the white majority. In such situa-
tions, the strict scrutiny test does not apply since the majority
group is presumed to have the capacity to protect itself through
the normal political process and thus does not require
"extraordinary protection" from the judiciary."
• . .There is, in sum, nothing about the statutory classification
involved here to suggest that it ...works against a group, which can
claim under the Equal Protection Clause that it is entitled to special
judicial protection.
97 S. Ct. at 468 (1976) (emphasis added).
39. 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (emphasis added).
40. Id. The Court also stated that the use of an "immutable characteristic" is
one of the traditional indices of suspect classifications.
41. There have been several post-Carolene cases which recite and apply an ap-
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THE FALLACY: MISAPPLICATION OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST BY
THE BAKKE COURT
The California Supreme Court's holding in Bakke that the
strict scrutiny test applies to the special admissions program
at the University of California at Davis Medical School, reads
as follows:
Classification by race is subject to strict scrutiny, at least
where the classification results in detriment to a person
because of his race....
The university asserts that the appropriate standard
to be applied in determining the validity of the special
admission program is the more lenient "rational basis"
test....
We cannot agree with the proposition that deprivation
based upon race is subject to a less demanding standard
of review under the Fourteenth Amendment if the race
discriminated against is the majority rather than a minor-
ity.42
This holding is incorrect. The strict scrutiny test, as developed
by the United States Supreme Court, is not applicable in the
context of the Bakke case.
The central material fact concerning the special admis-
sions program at the medical school is that it favors minority
applicants and, according to the California Supreme Court,
discriminates against white applicants.4 The strict scrutiny
test, as developed in the United States Supreme Court, was
clearly not designed to apply to legislation that imposes a bur-
den on members of a racial majority.
parent "general principle" that race is a suspect classification. See, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); cf Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (where the Court equated a classification based
on ancestry with a classification based on race). None of these cases, however, involved
discrimination against the white majority. Although Loving and McLaughlin involved
racially neutral schemes which appeared to affect whites and nonwhites alike, it is
apparent that the government, in each case, was attempting to segregate the races and
thus drive the minorities into further isolation. The detriment involved in such isola-
tion lies, of course, much more heavily on the minority races than on the white major-
ity.
The fact that the use of racial classifications is not always suspect has been
established in a number of post-Carolene cases. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1972); United States v. Montgomery County
Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965);
Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (summary affirmance).
42. 18 Cal. 3d at 49-50, 553 P.2d at 1162-63, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91.
43. Id. at 47-48, 553 P.2d at 1161-62, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90. The authors
believe that the program was merely an effort to neutralize the normal preference for
whites.
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The California court makes much of the fact that the equal
protection clause, by its terms, applies to all persons equally."
Although this observation is true, the implication drawn from
it is not. Admittedly, the equal protection clause does protect
all persons against irrational governmental classifications, i.e.,
it requires a valid governmental objective and a reasonable
fit between the ends and the means to support the chal-
lenged classification. It is inappropriate, however, to use the
language of the equal protection clause to determine the ap-
plicability of the suspect classification component of the strict
scrutiny test. The suspect classification concept was not de-
rived from the language of the equal protection clause, but
rather from the fundamental political perception that insular
minority groups need special judicial protection because of
their political powerlessness. In fact, at the very foundation of
the suspect classification doctrine is the concept that minority
groups are to be treated differently from the political majority.
Only Justice Tobriner, in dissent, recognized this crucial con-
cept."5
44. Id. at 51, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
45. The dissent stated:
[Iln addition to the history and purpose of the Fourteerith Amendment,
constitutional decisions explicating the appropriate scope of judicial re-
view provide a sound basis for the differential judicial treatment of invid-
ious and benign racial classifications. Beginning with Justice Stone's
celebrated "footnote 4" in U.S. v. Carolene Products Co. (1938) 304 U.S.
144, [82 L.Ed. 1234, 58 S. Ct. 7781, the Supreme Court has recognized
that whereas in most areas courts properly entertain a presumption that
governmental action is constitutional, "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of the political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." (Italics added.) (304 U.S. at pp. 152-153, fn.4
[82 L.Ed. at p. 1242].)
Heightened judicial scrutiny is accordingly appropriate when review-
ing laws embodying invidious racial classifications, because the political
process affords an inadequate check on discrimination against discrete
and insular minorities." (See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, supra, 403
U.S. 365, 372 [29 L.Ed.2d 534, 541-542]; Frontiero v. Richardson (1973)
411 U.S. 677, 685-686 [366 L.Ed.2d 583, 590-591, 93 S.Ct. 17641; Sail'er
Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18-20, [95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d
529, 46 A.L.R. 3d 351]; cf. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
(1976) - U.S. - [49 L.Ed.2d 520, 96 S. Ct. -1; San Antonio
School District v. Rodriquez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 28 [36 L.Ed.2d 16, 39-40,
93 S. Ct. 1278].) By the same token, however, such stringent judicial
review is not appropriate when, as here, racial classifications are utilized
remedially to benefit such minorities, for under such circumstances the
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BAKKE WITHOUT STRICT SCRUTINY
The California Supreme Court's erroneous application of
the strict scrutiny test dictated the conclusion that the univer-
sity's special admissions program is unconstitutional. After
initially determining that the strict scrutiny test should be
applied, the court followed precedents which indicated that the
test could be met only if the university showed both that a
compelling interest is served by the racial classification and
that no less onerous alternative is available to protect that
interest."6
Appropriately, the court did assume, at least for purposes
of argument, that the special admissions program is supported
by a compelling governmental interest, namely the social inter-
est in integrating the medical profession and thus terminating
at least one chapter in this nation's history of racial discrimina-
tion.47 The court found, however, that the special admissions
program could not pass constitutional muster because the
university failed to demonstrate the nonexistence of less oner-
ous alternatives for accomplishing this compelling purpose:
"[W]e are not convinced that the University has met its bur-
den of demonstrating that the basic goals of the program can-
not be substantially achieved by means less detrimental to the
rights of the majority."4 This standard imposes an extremely
strict, if not impossible burden on the university. The imposi-
tion of this burden flows directly from the application of the
strict scrutiny test.
Under traditional equal protection analysis, if the strict
scrutiny test is not applicable, the case must be decided under
the rational basis test.49 When the rational basis test is applied,
it is evident that the special admissions program is constitu-
tional. There is no serious dispute that the government has a
normal political process can be relied on to protect the majority who may
be incidentally injured by the classification scheme.
18 Cal. 3d at 79-80, 553 P.2d at 1183, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (emphasis added).
46. In the case of such a racial classification, not only must the
purpose of the classification serve a "compelling state interest," but it
must be demonstrated by rigid scrutiny that there are no reasonable ways
to achieve the state's goals by means which impose a lesser limitation on
the rights of the group disadvantaged by the classification. The burden
in both respects is upon the government.
Id. at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
47. Id. at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
48. Id.
49. A third intermediate standard has now emerged and must also be considered.
See note 6 supra and text accompanying notes 54-56 infra.
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valid interest in integrating the medical profession. Similarly,
it is certainly conceivable that direct recruitment and admis-
sion of minorities is rationally related to achieving this end. In
fact, it is difficult to imagine a more direct method. Thus,
application of the traditional rational basis test requires the
reversal of the decision in Bakke.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING SEX AS A SUSPECT
CLASSIFICATION
During the early 1970's certain Supreme Court justices
who believed that sex should be treated as a suspect classifica-
tion began to articulate new criteria for the application of the
strict scrutiny test, going beyond the majority/minority politi-
cal rationale of Carolene and its progeny. This development
was at least partly caused by the fact that the electorate is
roughly equally divided between men and women, and neither
sex appears to be the kind of politically powerless minority
group which needs extraordinary judicial protection. In this
situation, some of the justices appeared to be searching for new
theories which would allow the court to scrutinize sex classifi-
cations more closely than would be appropriate under the ra-
tional basis test. A discussion of Bakke in terms of fourteenth
amendment equal protection would not be complete without
reference to the emerging concepts.
One theory propounded by the justices who felt that sex
classifications were suspect was that women, like racial minori-
ties, have historically been politically powerless. This position
was articulated by Justice Brennan in Frontiero v. Richardson0
and Kahn v. Shevin.5' Justice Brennan's opinions emphasized
that women have been subjected to a history of discrimination
including denial of the right to vote and that, although women
now have political equality in terms of abstract voting power,
strict scrutiny of sex classifications burdening women is justi-
fied because, as a result of past discrimination, women con-
tinue to be "vastly underrepresented in this nation's decision-
making councils. ' 52 In other words, women should be treated
as a de facto political minority. This theory is entirely consis-
tent with the argument that racial classifications favoring the
white majority are not subject to strict scrutiny. However,
50. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
51. 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
52. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 685 n.17 (1973).
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other theories tentatively suggested to justify the strict scru-
tiny of sex classifications, if they had been adopted as control-
ling, might have caused more difficulty in the Bakke context.53
. Recently the Supreme Court has resolved this potential
problem by definitively holding that sex classifications are not
subject to strict scrutiny. In Craig v. Boren, all nine justices
agreed that the strict scrutiny test should not be applied to
legislation distinguishing between eighteen year old men and
women in the right to purchase 3.2% beer." Three justices
(Stewart, Burger and Rehnquist) applied the rational basis
test. The remaining six justices also concluded that strict scru-
tiny was not required. Justices Brennan, Marshall, White,
Blackmun and Powell held that the sex classification could be
sustained if it served "important governmental objectives" and
was "substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives."55 Justice Stevens arrived at a similar result by using still
different reasoning."
The outcome of Craig v. Boren clears an easy path for the
Supreme Court to return to the original Carolene Products ra-
tionale for the strict scrutiny test and to hold that racial classi-
fications burdening the white majority are not suspect. There
is no longer any need for the Court to stretch the strict scrutiny
test to cover groups which do not have the classic characteris-
tics of insular political minorities.
In the aftermath of Craig v. Boren, the closer question may
be whether racial classifications burdening the majority should
be evaluated under the traditional rational basis test or under
an intermediate test similar to that used in evaluating the
Oklahoma statute concerning the sale of 3.2% beer. It seems
quite likely that, when Bakke or some comparable case reaches
the Court, the new "important interest/substantial relation"
test will be applied. If so, there is no reason why special minor-
ity admissions programs should not be held constitutional.
There is an important governmental interest in combatting the
continuing effects of the racial discrimination which has
plagued this nation's history. Moreover, special programs ex-
53., The most noteworthy example is the notion that classifications based upon
"immutable characteristics" are suspect and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. The
theory that immutability alone justifies strict scrutiny, however, has been rejected by
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
54. 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976). See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
55. 97 S. Ct. at 457.
56. Id. at 464.
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plicitly designed for minorities are substantially related to the
achievement of this interest. In fact, there is an almost perfect
fit between the problem and the solution, since racial prejudice
and discrimination operate to the detriment of all members of
the affected minority groups, and can best be remedied by
programs designed specifically for the members of the racial
groups adversely affected.
CONCLUSION
There are a number of persuasive policy considerations
which support the existence of special admissions programs
for racial minorities. There can be no doubt that white per-
sons in this society are granted a pervasive de facto preference
and that minority persons, regardless of individual merit, are
victimized both by explicit racial hostility and by unconscious
racial stereotypes on the part of the white majority. A basic
sense of justice demands that this unfair treatment of minori-
ties be rectified.
Prejudice, both conscious and unconscious, is racially spe-
cific. It cannot be effectively combatted unless the remedies
are also racially specific and sufficiently potent to offset the
very real preference which white persons unjustifiably enjoy. If
the equal protection clause is construed in a manner which
makes effective programs for remedying discrimination against
racial minorities illegal, then what was originally designed as
a charter of equality for black persons will be transformed into
a barrier against equality. 7
These and other compelling policy considerations have
been spelled out by many authorities, including Justice Tobri-
ner in his Bakke dissent, and are beyond the scope of this
discussion. Suffice it to say that the authors of this article share
the perception that special programs for racial minorities are
wholly justified and indeed urgently needed if this nation is
ever to put an end to its tragic history of denying equality to
racial minorities.
The purpose of this article is to show one clear path out of
the trap that the California Supreme Court set for legitimate
civil rights efforts. Stated simply, correct application of equal
57. The original purpose of the equal protection clause was to protect the black
persons who had been victimized by the institution of slavery. See, e.g., Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
81 (1873); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 H~Av.
L. REv. 1, 60 (1955).
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protection analysis leads to the conclusion that the special
admissions program at issue in Bakke v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California is constitutionally permissible. The con-
trary decision of the California Supreme Court was based on a
misapplication of the strict scrutiny test for evaluating gov-
ernmental classifications under the equal protection clause.
This test, in its origin, its rationale, and its subsequent appli-
cations, has been confined to the review of racial classifications
directed against minority groups. It has no application in cases
involving classifications which impose burdens on majority
groups which have no need for extraordinary judicial protec-
tion. When the correct test-i.e., the rational basis test or the
new "intermediate" test-is applied, there can be no doubt
that the special admissions program at issue in Bakke is con-
stitutional.
